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Diplomacy 6 min read

When Diplomacy Breaks Down, Everything Breaks Down

From Iran's oil leverage to Hungary's EU reset, the global order is fragmenting along lines nobody predicted five years ago.

When Diplomacy Breaks Down, Everything Breaks Down

Oil just hit $120. Not because of a refinery explosion or a hurricane. Because of uncertainty about whether Iran will blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

That’s the sentence that should scare you. Not the price itself—that’s noise. The reason is the real story. Markets don’t freak out over threats that seem contained or manageable. They freak out when they can’t model the future anymore.

And right now, nobody can model anything.

From below of various flags on flagpoles located in green park in front of entrance to the UN headquarters in Geneva Photo by Mathias Reding / Pexels

The Middle East Is Pricing in Chaos

Here’s what we know: oil swung hard on reports of an “extended” Iran blockade. The word “extended” matters. It suggests this isn’t a bluff or a temporary measure—it’s a threat Tehran might actually execute and hold for weeks, maybe months.

Iran’s been cornered before. In 2022, when the U.S. withdrew from the nuclear deal under Trump, crude went through the roof. But that was predictable adversarialism. Both sides knew the moves in advance. This feels different. The Middle East is already burning—Israel and Gaza, the Houthis hitting shipping, proxy networks across Iraq and Syria—and now we’re looking at the possibility of energy weaponization on top of that.

Here’s my read: Iran’s considering blockade not because it wants a war, but because it’s losing the conventional one. When a weakening power reaches for its most destructive tool, it’s usually because negotiation leverage has evaporated. The U.S. has a president who just won re-election. Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities aren’t off the table. Tehran’s running out of moves that don’t involve the oil trade.

If they actually do this, we’re not talking about a 10% price spike and recovery. We’re talking about cascading effects through Europe, India, Japan—every economy that depends on Gulf oil. And unlike 2022, there’s no spare capacity to tap. Saudi production is already maxed. The U.S. strategic reserve got drawn down hard during Biden’s term.

Hungary Just Rewrote the EU Script

Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, something equally destabilizing is happening at a different speed.

Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won a landslide election. Now he’s in Brussels meeting EU leaders, and the first signal he’s sending is clear: unfreeze our money.

Hungary had billions locked up because Viktor Orbán refused to play by EU rules on judicial independence and democratic norms. It was a standoff. The EU had leverage; Orbán had stubbornness. Magyar’s win changes the math completely. He’s not Orbán. He’s pro-EU, anti-corruption, and he knows the EU’s going to open the checkbook if it means pulling Budapest back into the Western orbit.

What’s fascinating—and what should worry EU strategists—is the timing. Just as Europe’s trying to present a unified front on Ukraine, on trade, on defense spending, here comes a destabilizing election result that forces Brussels to immediately start making concessions to a newly empowered leader. It’s like watching a poker player double down on a hand they haven’t fully examined yet. Yes, Magyar probably is better than Orbán. But the precedent is poison. Other EU members are watching. If Hungary gets rewarded for years of obstruction by getting its funding back the moment it elects a friendlier government, what’s the message to Warsaw, or Romania, or any other member state thinking about testing Brussels?

My prediction: Magyar gets his money, but the EU negotiates it as a time-limited reset, not a permanent rehabilitation. He’ll play ball for 18 months, then find new reasons to friction-test the system. Europe’s not getting a partner. It’s getting a reprieve.

Close-up of a vintage typewriter with the word 'Diplomacy' on a paper sheet. Photo by Markus Winkler / Pexels

When Cartels Own States

Then there’s Mexico. An actual sitting governor, Rubén Rocha Moya of Sinaloa, indicted by the U.S. government for conspiring with the Sinaloa Cartel. Not a local police chief. Not a mid-level bureaucrat. A governor. A person who controls a state budget, commands security forces, and represents Mexico in federal matters.

This isn’t new—Mexico’s had cartel-connected officials before—but the explicitness of the U.S. indictment is. Washington isn’t hiding behind anonymous sources or diplomatic language. It’s saying: your state’s executive is dirty. So dirty we’re filing charges.

The optics are brutal for Mexico City. President Claudia Sheinbaum has to respond somehow, but her options are all bad. Arrest Rocha Moya? That looks like she’s capitulating to U.S. pressure. Defend him? That looks like her government protects cartel associates. Do nothing? That looks like her government can’t enforce its own laws.

What’s really happening is the cartel’s leverage over Mexican politics just got quantified in federal court. When the U.S. brings charges against a sitting governor, it’s signaling that the entire tier of state-level governance in certain regions is compromised. That’s not a corruption scandal. That’s institutional collapse.

Taiwan’s Lifeline Just Got Tested

Over in the Pacific, China’s making a move on Paraguay.

Paraguay’s one of the last countries that still recognizes Taiwan as a legitimate government. It’s a strange relationship—Paraguay’s landlocked, poor, and thousands of miles away from the Taiwan Strait. But it matters symbolically. Every country Taiwan loses is another chip in Beijing’s “inevitable reunification” narrative.

China knows this. So they’re testing whether Paraguay can be flipped. Not with invasion or force, but with money, development deals, and the simple arithmetic of what being on China’s good side looks like compared to Taiwan’s.

I’m genuinely uncertain how this plays out. Taiwan’s got limited financial tools compared to China. But Paraguay’s already close to China economically. If Beijing decides to push hard, Taiwan might lose. And that would be the third or fourth diplomatic loss in the Pacific in the last three years.

Here’s what matters: Taiwan isn’t losing because of military weakness. It’s losing because it can’t outbid China for diplomatic relationships with smaller, poorer nations. That’s a vulnerability the U.S. can’t solve with aircraft carriers.

From below of various flags on flagpoles located in green park in front of entrance to the UN headquarters in Geneva Photo by Mathias Reding / Pexels

The Domestic Cracks Are Worse

But I want to step back. Because the scariest trend isn’t any single story above. It’s that the U.S. itself is experiencing simultaneous institutional shocks.

A former FBI director indicted over an Instagram post. Two assassination attempts on the sitting president. A mass shooting suspect whose ChatGPT searches should’ve triggered alerts, and now families are suing OpenAI for negligence in the company’s moderations. A stabbing in London treated as terrorism.

These aren’t one-off incidents. They’re symptoms of institutions that’ve lost the capacity to predict and prevent violence at scale. Whether it’s social media moderation, security services, or law enforcement, something’s broken in the detection apparatus.

When your own country’s institutions can’t keep you safe, your ability to project power abroad gets weaker. Not immediately. But inevitably. Adversaries watch. They see a superpower struggling with internal coherence and they start calculating differently.

The oil price hitting $120 isn’t just about Iran anymore. It’s about whether the U.S. government—fractured, reactive, fighting itself—can manage a Middle East crisis while also handling Mexico, Taiwan, and Europe. It’s about overstretch masquerading as global engagement.

What I’m Watching

  • Oil price and Iranian rhetoric in the next 30 days. If crude stays above $115 for more than two weeks, we’re entering recession territory. Watch for Iranian media language—if they start using words like “inevitable” and “defensive,” blockade probability just jumped. The trigger: any Israeli strike on Iranian territory would likely trigger a response.

  • Paraguay’s official stance on Taiwan by Q2 2025. Will Sheinbaum publicly reaffirm the relationship or go quiet? Quiet is capitulation. Beijing’s probably offering infrastructure deals worth $2-3 billion. Taiwan can’t match that without Congress approval.

  • How many more U.S. institutions report “detection failures” on assassination/violence threats in the next 90 days. This one’s speculative, but if you see Secret Service, FBI, or NSA all admitting they missed warning signs on multiple incidents, that’s a sign the detection apparatus is systemically compromised, not just occasionally failing. That changes how markets price U.S. stability.

The global order isn’t collapsing. It’s fragmenting. And the fragments aren’t moving randomly—they’re being pulled by powers that see the cracks and know how to exploit them.